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Tort Law: Mitchell v. Buchheit 
Wrongful Death of Minors: Missouri Ends the Fiction 
Adherence to the principle of stare decisis produces stability and predicta-
bility, but when precedent perpetuates a rule outmoded by time and reason, 
fiction and injustice result. "It is revolting," Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once 
commented, "to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV."I Unfortunately, the treatment of wrongful death 
cases involving minors illustrates such blind imitation of the past. Prior to the 
Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Buchheit,2 Missouri courts 
limited recovery of parents seeking damages for the wrongful death of their 
minor children to the value of the child's services to the parents during his 
minority. Probable expenses of rearing the child, including support, education 
and medical care were deducted from the parents' recovery.3 Parents of minor 
children could not, however, recover for services reasonably expected after the 
child's twenty-first birthday, even though parents of adult children were permit-
ted such recovery. 
This rule, when Missouri courts carved it from the state's first wrongful 
death statute: was defendable. The rule reflected the mores and legal standards 
of the time, when employment of children was common and acceptable and a 
child's pecuniary contributions frequently were substantial and probable. 5 The 
rule, however, became a fiction in a modem context. Today, public policy op-
poses child labor,s and children's contributions to their parents rarely exceed the 
estimated $20,000 to $33,000 it costs to raise a child to age 18.7 Nonetheless, prior 
to Mitchell, Missouri courts tenaciously adhered to the rule even while acknowl-
edging that it was "subject to criticism on the basis of logic .... "8 The fiction 
finally ended with the supreme court's decision in Mitchell that parents seeking 
damages for the wrongful death oftheir child may establish "a reasonable prob-
ability of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of [the] child beyond the 
age of minority."9 With the Mitchell decision, Missouri joined the majority of 
1. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). 
2. 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977). 
3. Oliver v. Morgan, 73 S.W.2d 993 (Mo. 1934). 
4. Mo. REv. STAT. ch. LI, § 4 (1855), which stated in part: 
[lJn every such action, the jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and just, 
not exceeding five thousand dollars, with reference to the necessary injury resulting from 
such death, to the surviving parties who may be entitled to sue, and, also, having regard 
to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect or 
default. 
5. The 1900 U.S. census reported 26% of males 10 to 15 years of age, or 1.3 million, and 10.2%, 
or almost 500,000, of females the same age were gainfully employed. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
TWELITH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: OCCUPATIONS, Table LITI (1904). 
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212 (1961) and Mo. REv. STAT. § 294.021 (1969) prohibit gainful employ-
ment of any kind for children under 14 years of age. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 294.011-.040 (1969) restrict 
the hours and type of employment for those 14 to 16 years of age. 
7. Reed & McIntosh, Costs of Children, ECONOMIC AsPECTS OF POPULATION CHANGE 337 (E. 
Morss and R. Reed eds. 1972); Anderson v. Lale, 216 N.W.2d 152, 156-58 (S.D. 1974). 
8. Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo. App. 1968). 
9. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977). 
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state court decisions and legislative enactments in this area. IO 
It is reasonable to expect the ruling to increase future awards in wrongful 
death cases involving minors. However, because of the courts' prior attempts to 
soothe the harshness of the previous premajority-contributions-only rule, the 
increase may be small. Prior to Mitchell, the courts had permitted sizeable 
judgments in an effort to avoid the harsh consequences of the previous rule. In 
addition, the ruling may have only minimal impact on the criteria the courts 
will allow jurors to use for determining damages. Standards used in the only 
Missouri case prior to Mitchell permitting recovery of after-majority contribu-
tions generally mirrored those used in states already allowing such recovery. II 
Apparently, extensive development of case law precedent will be unnecessary. 
Although Missouri joined the majority of states which permit recovery for 
after-majority contributions, the Mitchell court declined to follow a strong trend 
allowing recovery of such nonpecuniary losses as society, companionship, grief 
and mental anguish. The court did not, however, preclude such recovery. The 
supreme court merely set the issue aside as one "not raised on appeal, "12 there-
fore avoiding the compelling arguments for permitting recovery of nonpecuniary 
losses. 
THE CASE 
The parents of Sidney Mett Mitchell, 19 years and 10 months of age, 
brought a wrongful death action arising out of a February 3, 1971 traffic acci-
dent. The youth was unmarried and living with his parents when he was killed 
in a collision between the dump truck he was driving and the defendant's 
tractor-trailer rig. He had earned $1176.21 before his death and had voluntarily 
contributed a minimum of $40 a week to his parents. In addition, he frequently 
purchased family groceries and performed chores around the house and farm. 
The youth owned his own automobile and paid for its insurance. Trial testimony 
indicated that he had never expressed an intention of getting married or leaving 
his parents' home. 13 
The jury awarded the plaintiff parents $12,500 but they appealed the trial 
court's ruling that restricted evidence of damages to the one year and two month 
period from the decedent's death to his twenty-first birthday. Plaintiff's counsel 
argued on appeal that it was: 
[Plure nonsense to require a conclusion as a matter of law that on his 21st 
birthday he would have packed his belongings, left the home, abandoned his 
parents and ceased all contributions when he had so regularly and unselfishly 
given the same as a matter of desire rather than legal obligation in the past. 
There being substantial evidence that his contributions and services would cer-
tainly continue into the future, beyond the age of majority, the jury's verdict is 
10. The majority comprises Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, 
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. Id. at 533-34. 
11. Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1968). 
12. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977). 
13. Brief for Respondent at 3,4, Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977). 
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inadequate because they were illegally refused the opportunity to consider such 
future damages. 14 
123 
The supreme court agreed and ordered a new trial on damages including "the 
reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of said child 
beyond the age of minority."15 
HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE COURT'S RULING 
The rule restricting recovery to the decedent's premajority contributions 
originated, but was not explained, in Rains v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & 
Southern Railway CO.18 Later, in Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Railway CO.,.7 the 
court reasoned that since Missouri's wrongful death statute l8 did not allow par-
ents to recover for the death of their adult child, recovery for a minor child 
should also be restricted to the child's minority. The reason for prohibiting 
recovery for adult children, the court said, was the lack of legal obligation 
between the child and the parents. The court interpreted the wrongful death 
statute's reference to "necessary injury" as indicating that damages are to be 
measured by a "reasonably certain and fixed rule growing out of the relations 
existing between a parent and his minor child, and the corresponding duties, 
rights, and obligations of that relation."lu In other words, parents could not 
recover for after-majority contributions because the child's legal obligation to 
his parents ended on his twenty-first birthday, even though there might be every 
reason to believe that the child would continue to provide services to his parents. 
The justification for restricting recovery to premajority contributions ended 
in 1905 when the' state legislature revised the wrongful death statute to permit 
administrators of a decedent's estate to initiate a wrongful death action where 
the decedent was an unmarried minor and there were no parents.2O There was, 
therefore, no legislative basis to justify a court's insistance upon a legal obliga-
tion between the child and his parents as a condition .precedent to recovery. 
Nevertheless, instead of revising their position concerning after-majority recov-
ery, Missouri courts began applying a dual standard-one for adult children and 
quite another for minors. 
The Springfield Court of Appeals correctly construed the 1905 statutory 
revision as signalling an end to the requirement of a legal obligation between 
14. [d. at 27. 
15. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977). 
16. 71 Mo. 164 (1879). 
17. 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888). 
18. Mo. REV. STAT. § 2123 (1879) had virtually the same wording as the original 1855 statute. 
See note 4 supra. 
It is interesting to note that in interpreting the "necessary injury" wording in the statute, the 
Missouri Supreme Court commented in 1904 that the words "mayor may not include the net loss 
of services, but it also covers other injuries besides loss of services. It includes loss of the comfort, 
society, and love of the child." Sharp v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 179 Mo. 553, 78 S.W. 787 (1904). However, 
a later Kansas City appellate court nonetheless applied the Parsons rule. "[W]e think the state-
ment [in the Sharp casel was inadvertently made and it doubtless was the cause of the trial court 
giving the instructions complained of in the case." Marshall v. Consolidated Jack Mines Co., 119 
Mo. App. 270, 95 S.W. 972 (1906). 
19. Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 286, 296, 6 S.W. 464, 467 (l8BS). 
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 5425 (1909) survives as § 537.080(3) (1969). 
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a parent and child in wrongful death cases involving adult children. In such 
cases, the court ruled, it was sufficient that there was "a reasonable probability 
of pecuniary benefit to one from the continuing life of another."21 Oddly enough, 
the court ignored the statutory revision in cases involving minors. The courts 
continued applying the Parsons rule as though the legislature had never acted. 
The illogical result was that if an unmarried child was wrongfully killed the day 
before his twenty-first birthday, the parents were limited to recovery for one 
day. If the child lived until his birthday, however, the parents were entitled to 
damages for his continued life. 
The courts later acknowledged the validity of arguments questioning the 
rule's logic. In 1954, the supreme court hesitantly applied the Parsons rule in 
McCrary v. Ogden:!2 "Whether our past interpretations of [Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
537.090 (1949»),23 to the effect that recovery is limited to pecuniary loss and in 
the case of an infant, to the value of services during minority only, are basically 
correct, may be debatable-we have consistently so construed the section." The 
St. Louis Court of Appeals was also troubled by the rule when it stated: 
"[W]hile the rule has been subject to criticism on the basis of logic as well as 
on the basis that such a rule seemingly conflicts with what the Missouri Su-
preme Court has stated to be the legislative intent of § 537.090 ... the rule 
remains in force and effect to the present time and we would be compelled to 
apply it."24 Thus, although the foundation had vanished, the court blindly ad-
hered to the rule. 
The Mitchell court noted that at times the judiciary had attempted "to 
avoid the harshness of the rationale of the Parsons case."25 In Mudd v. Quinn, 28 
the supreme court sustained a $30,000 judgment for the parents of a girl nearly 
18 years of age. The court ruled that a fatigued driver operating a truck with 
faulty brakes was a sufficiently aggravating circumstance to justify the large 
award. The court permitted the maximum award of $25,000 to stand in Tripp 
v. Choate, 'r1 an action for the wrongful death of a 16 year-old boy. The court held 
that evidence of the boy's poisoning by a chemical spray and painful death to 
be aggravating enough to support the judgment. 
The status of after-majority recoveries was further confused by the Missouri 
Approved Jury Instruction which called only for damages which plaintiffs were 
"[reasonably certain to sustain in the future] as a direct result of the death of 
their child .... "28 The instruction did not restrict recovery to premajority 
contributions. The Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions, 
21. McCullough v. W.H. Powell Lumber Co., 205 Mo. App. 15, 216 S.W. 803 (1919). 
22. 267 S.W.2d 670, 676 (Mo. 1954). 
23. Wording of the statute is virtually the same as the original 1855 statute. See note 4 supra. 
The Supreme Court construed the legislative intent of the statute to include admission of 
evidence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of "pecuniary loss of every kind and 
character." Steger v. Meehan, 63 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Mo. 1933). 
24. Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo. App. 1968) (footnote omitted). 
25. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528,533 (Mo. 1977). 
26. 462 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1971). 
27. 415 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1967). 
28. MAl § 5.03 (West 1969). That portion of the instruction enclosed in brackets may be added 
at plaintiffs option where there is evidence of future damage. 
HeinOnline -- 47 UMKC L. Rev. 125 1978-1979
1978] MITCHELL v. BUCHHEIT 125 
unable to reconcile the Parsons rule with reality, settled upon a "broad pecuni-
ary loss standard."29 In the comments accompanying the instruction, the Com-
mittee stated that it doubted whether "the Supreme Court intends to ... limit 
the recovery of a widowed mother whose only son and sole support was killed a 
week before his 21st birthday. This is a question of substantive law which the 
Committee cannot resolve."30 The supreme court did little, if anything, to end 
the confusion when it suggested in Mudd that the parties use the required 
instruction and that at the same time the defense counsel argue the Parsons rule 
to the juryY 
The confusion and fiction finally ended in 1973 when the Missouri General 
Assembly spoke so emphatically on the issue that the Mitchell court had little 
choice but to abandon the Parsons rule completely. The new statute permitted 
"such damages as will fairly and justly compensate such party or parties for any 
damages he or they have sustained and are reasonably certain to sustain in the 
future as a direct result of such death. "32 By replacing the "necessary injury" 
statutory language with language providing for recovery of damages "reasonably 
certain to [be] sustain[ed] in the future," the legislature clearly indicated its 
intent to extend recovery beyond minority. The Mitchell court, therefore, ac-
knowledged that the old rule could not "stand on its own logic. "33 Aside from 
its lack of statutory support, it was pure conjecture to believe that a child was 
a financial asset to his parents. 34 In fact, "strict adherence to the rule could lead, 
reductio ad absurdum, to the conclusion that the tortfeasor should be reim-
bursed for having saved the parent money."35 
Now that the supreme court has ended its illogical, blind imitation of the 
past, future courts must establish acceptable criteria for jurors to use in deter-
mining the reasonable probability of after-majority contributions. The stan-
dards of proof which develop, however, may not be much different than what is 
already required by the Missouri courts. 
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING AFTER-MAJORITY 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The Missouri Court of Appeals has granted a sketchy preview of the proof 
that will be required in determining a deceased minor's probable after-majority 
contributions to his parents. In Collins v. Stroh,38 the jury considered the after-
majority contributions of a minor who was two months short of her twenty-first 
birthday at the time of her death. The court permitted the precedent-breaking 
decision to stand because the defense counsel had failed to object and to pre-
serve the error for appeal. Thus, the appellate court considered whether the 
29.Id. 
30.Id. 
3!. Mudd v. Quinn, 462 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (Mo. 1971). 
32. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1973). 
33. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977). 
34. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
35. Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 197, 198 
(1971). 
36. 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1968). 
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evidence presented was adequate to justify a $15,000 judgment for the dece-
dent's parents. Although there was no proof that the decedent made monetary 
contributions to her parents, the court held that evidence that she had a full-
time job, visited her parents once a month and during vacations, helped with 
housework and cared for her 14 year-old brother when she visited was sufficient 
to justify the jury's inference that her "services" would continue after majority. 
"[T]he jury's award must be based, not upon direct, positive evidence," 
the Collins court stated, "but upon probabilities which the jury might reasona-
bly find exist, considering the child's age, condition, health, mentality, person-
ality and perspective, and the parents' ages, attitude and circumstances."37 The 
court stated that jury instructions should not require application of mathemati-
cal equations, but should give jurors broad latitude. "[T]he award of damages 
can rest only on considerations of the most general character and much must 
be left to the common sense of the jury."38 
The Collins standard is markedly similar to that employed in other states 
allowing recovery for after-majority contributions. Several states permit juries 
to consider the deceased minor's relations with and intention to lend assistance 
to his parents. 39 A decedent's promise to aid his parents is generally admissible 
into evidence!o Evidence of the parents' economic need is also admissible. 41 
Missouri courts generally have admitted evidence of the parents' economic sta~ 
tus "because poor parents are likely to have more pressing need for, and reasona-
bly may have more confident expectation of, future contributions by their chil-
dren than would affluent parents."42 Michigan courts have also admitted evi-
dence of the parents' economic need, reasoning that such evidence serves as an 
indicator that the minor decedent would have begun working at an early age.43 
Parents in a Minnesota case "possessed so little of this world's goods that there 
was a reasonable possibility of their becoming dependent later," and were there-
fore permitted to introduce evidence oftheir financial status. 44 Courts in at least 
37. Id. at 689, quoting Hornbuckle v. McCarthy, 295 Mo. 162, 243 S.W. 327 (1922). 
38. Id. In a federal diversity of citizenship case applying Missouri wrongful death law, the 
federal district court ruled that the plaintiff could enter into evidence the probability of the deceased 
minor's after-majority contributions to meet the $10,000 minimum claim requirement. The court 
agreed with the plaintiffs that "the proper test is the reasonable probability of pecuniary loss 
resulting from the decedent's death ... ," and the jury "may take into consideration the probable 
willingness and ability of the deceased to continue the pecuniary benefits to his parents after his 
majority .... " Allen v. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 221 F. Supp. 217, 218 (W.D. Mo. 1963). 
39. Sutherland v. State, 189 Misc. 953, 68 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1947); Butterfield v. 
Community Light & Power Co., 115 Vt. 23, 49 A.2d 415 (1946); Rio Grande, EI Paso & Sante Fe 
R.R. Co. v. Dupree, 56 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Almanzo, 22 
Ariz. 431, 198 P. 457 (1928); Ptak v. Kuetemeyer, 182 Wis. 357, 196 N.w. 855 (1924); Cincinnati 
St. Ry. Co. v. Altemeier, 60 Ohio 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899). 
40. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Parker, 200 Ark. 620, 140 S.W.2d 997, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 
696 (1940); Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co., 214 Wis. 166,252 N.W. 706 (1934); Southwestern 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Thomas, 249 F. 325 (5th Cir. 1918). Contra, Leary v. West Jersey & S.R. Co. 
Boyajian, 1 N.J. Misc. 549, 146 A. 359 (1923) (such evidence is in a sense hearsay and a mere 
expression of an opinion as to the future). 
41. Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. App. 1960). 
42. Id. at 615 (footnote omitted). 
43. Robins v. Director Gen. of Railroads, 207 Mich. 437, 174 N.W. 124 (1919). 
44. Luther v. Domack, 179 Minn. 528, 229 N.W. 784 (1930). 
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two states have admitted evidence of occupation of the decedent's father, since 
children frequently pursue the same general class of business. 45 
Courts permitting after-majority recovery have allowed sizeable judgments 
even though the deceased minor was too young to have worked.48 These courts 
permitted juries to consider, in addition to evidence of a child's intent to aid 
his parents, unusual skills or talents of the deceased; the child's character or 
morals; his generosity, economy and thrift; and the parents' plans concerning 
their child's future. 47 
IMPACT OF THE MITCHELL RULING 
If the Missouri courts had been faithfully adhering to the Parsons rule, 
although criteria for determining damages in wrongful death cases involving 
minors would remain much the same, jury awards would likely increase with 
application of the Mitchell ruling. However, when a legal tradition is in direct 
conflict with reality, courts frequently find covert ways to circumvent precedent 
in an attempt to ensure justice. Since application of the Parsons rule had been 
avoided in several Missouri decisions, the impact of the Mitchell decision on 
jury awards should be only minimal. 
The Mitchell court commented that "judicial efforts [had been made] to 
avoid the harshness of the rationale of the Parsons case ... ,"48 citing, among 
others, the Mudd case. In these cases, the courts liberally construed provisions 
in the wrongful death statutes for the jury's consideration of "the mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or default."49 In 
the Mudd and Tripp cases, for example, the court upheld judgments of $30,000 
and $25,000 respectively to the parents of decedents in their late teens. A com-
parison of the Mudd and Tripp awards with the $15,000 judgment in the Collins 
case, where the jury considered only after-majority contributions, suggests that 
the Mitchell ruling will have only a minimal impact on the size offuture awards. 
Rather than increase the awards, the ruling may tend to stabilize the discrepan-
cies in jury awards which resulted from judicial attempts to soothe conflicts 
between the Parsons rule and notions of fair compensation. 
EXTENDING MITCHELL TO INCLUDE RECOVERY OF 
NONECONOMIC LOSSES 
A more stabilizing effect on jury awards would be achieved by dropping the 
pecuniary loss rule in favor of all-inclusive recovery.50 "Specifically, in the pecu-
niary and general loss states, the pecuniary loss doctrine has been softened to 
allow substantial recoveries, while in the all-inclusive loss states restraint gener-
45. Love v. Detroit, J. & C. R. Co., 170 Mich. 1,135 N.W. 963.(1912); Fox v. Oakland Conso!. 
St. Ry., 118 Cal. 55, 50 P. 25 (1897). 
46. Love v. Detroit, J. & C. R. Co., 170 Mich. 1, 135 N.W. 963 (1912); Russell v. Windsor 
Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900). 
47. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 4:31 (2d ed. 1975). 
48. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977). 
49. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1969). 
50. Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children: A Nonparametric Statistical Analy-
sis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 884 (1974). 
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ally has been exercised in assessing amounts for anguish."51 An amicus curiae52 
in the Mitchell case argued that the legislators intended all-inclusive recoveries 
when they substituted "any damages" for "necessary injury" in the state's 
wrongful death statute. Instead of denying the validity of the amicus' argument, 
the Mitchell court set it aside, stating that the argument was "not applicable 
to this case or dispositive of any issue presented by the parties."53 
Prior to the state's first wrongful death statute, Missouri common law per-
mitted recovery of nonpecuniary damages. In James u. Christy,54 the Missouri 
Supreme Court recognized a father's right to recover for the lost "society and 
comforts" of his deceased 15 year-old son. However, the father died before the 
court rendered judgment and the justices ruled that the right to recover for loss 
of society and comforts was a personal one which did not survive a parent's 
death. Nonetheless, two years later the legislature abrogated the parents' right 
to recover for such losses. Still, as the amicus curiae argued, there was at that 
time "a statutory directive that law enacted in derogation of the common law 
had to be strictly construed."55 Therefore, the court's later construction of the 
statute's phrase "necessary injury" as eliminating "an existing, substantive, 
common law right of a parent ... to recover damages for tortious loss of the 
society and companionship of his slain son" fell far short of the demands for 
strict construction. 58 
The courts missed an opportunity to correct the situation in 1955 when the 
General Assembly revised the wrongful death statute to allow recovery of dam-
ages "for the death" of, in addition to the pre-existing right to damages for 
"necessary injury resulting from such death."57 This arguably indicated that the 
legislature intended to abandon the restriction on recovery of nonpecuniary 
losses, especially in light of the 1973 statutory change permitting recovery for 
"any damages."58 The supreme court failed to detect any significance in the 1955 
revision and in subsequent cases failed to mention it, relying instead on pre-1955 
case law authority. The legislature has clearly indicated its intent to permit 
recovery for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses by amending the statute 
to allow awards for "any damages." 
Meanwhile, other states with similarly worded wrongful death statutes 
allow recovery under statutes calling for "such damages as the jury may deter-
mine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind .... "59 
California has retained its pecuniary loss rule under a statute allowing "such 
51. [d. at 890. 
52. Amicus Curiae Brief of Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys, Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 
S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
53. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Mo. 1977). 
54. 18 Mo. 162 (1853). 
55. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 52, at 13, Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977). 
56. [d. 
57. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1959) stated: "[Tlhe jury may give to the surviving party or 
parties who may be entitled to sue such damages. . . as the jury may deem fair and just for the 
death and loss thus occasioned, with reference to the necessary injury resulting from such death 
" 
58. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 52, at 16, 17, Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 
1977). 
59. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1977); Avery v. Collins, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695 (1934). 
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damages . . as under all of the circumstances of the case may be just. "80 
However, the state still allows what amounts to noneconomic damages by per-
mitting juries to attach pecuniary value to the noneconomic interests. While 
California's approach would provide a means for Missouri to broaden wrongful 
death recoveries to include nonpecuniary damages without abandoning its long-
lived commitment to the pecuniary loss rule, such an approach would perpetu-
ate the fiction which tainted the pre-Mitchell case law. 
CONCLUSION 
Missouri has finally freed itself from an illogical rule lacking statutory 
support. The court's struggle to rectify the rule's injustices, while at the same 
time respecting the doctrine of stare decisis, illustrates the difficulties that 
result when courts are compelled to adhere to case law precedent. As a result, 
fiction shrouded the judiciary's treatment of wrongful death cases involving 
children. The Mitchell court has begun the task of breaking these bonds, but it 
will be only a halfway measure if future courts do not permit recovery of nonpe-
cuniary damages. 
The rationale for allowing recovery for damages is to right a wrong suffered. 
Money is only part of the damages suffered when parents' children are killed. 
The rule prohibiting recovery for the whole of damages-monetary as well as 
emotional-stems from a time when courts felt noneconomic losses were imagi-
nary and immeasurable, and therefore inappropriate. Our economic system has 
changed, and along with this change has come a realization that, especially in 
the case of children, money losses are the least significant damages. The Gen-
eral Assembly was cognizant of this fact when, in 1973, it insisted on recovery 
of "any damages." Adherence to the pecuniary loss rule is, therefore, logically 
and legislatively impermissible. 
Paul M. Spinden 
60. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 376 (West 1975). 
